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EUDAIMONISM, TELEOLOGY,  
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:  
MEISTER ECKHART ON “LIVING WITHOUT A WHY”
John M. Connolly
Recent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition 
of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from Aristotle or from Thomas Aqui-
nas. In this essay I briefly outline the ethical approaches of these two towering 
figures, and then describe more fully the virtue ethics of Meister Eckhart, a 
medieval thinker who admired, though critically, both Aristotle and Aquinas. 
His related but distinctively original approach to the virtuous life is marked 
by a striking and seemingly paradoxical injunction to “live without why.”
The virtue ethics1 of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are related, Aqui-
nas having incorporated into his moral theology substantial elements of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Their roles in the lively contemporary re-
vival of virtue-ethics show that both of these ethical systems continue to 
inspire philosophers, and to exercise, in Thomas’s case, truly substantial 
influence beyond the academy, since much Catholic moral teaching and 
preaching derives from his writings. Obviously, many continue to feel the 
attraction of the idea that at the heart of ethics is a deep connection be-
tween the quality of the life we lead, as measured by our virtues and vices, 
and the fulfillment or happiness which each of us can attain.
But nowhere do Aristotle and Thomas—not to mention Meister Eckhart 
—differ more strikingly than over the nature of this fulfillment. Aristo-
tle’s eudaimonism is the view that our happiness or perfection, that is, 
the objectively most desirable form of life, consists in the active practice 
of the moral and (especially) intellectual virtues.2 While large stretches of 
I am grateful for helpful comments from Ernie Alleva, Lynne Baker, Charles Donahue, 
Jay Garfield, Murray Kiteley, Gareth Matthews, Bernard McGinn, Janice Moulton, 
and Malcolm Smith, as well as audience members at the Fall 2003 meeting of the 
Northern New England Philosophical Association and the 39th International Con-
gress on Medieval Studies, where versions of this paper were presented. I am par-
ticularly indebted to Harold Skulsky and to Tobias Hoffmann for careful criticisms of 
early drafts, to Theo Kobusch, and to two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
1Virtue-ethics has been one of the most active fields in moral philosophy in 
recent decades, while William Bennett’s The Book of Virtues (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996) was a number-one best seller in the U.S. during the 1990s.
2More fully: the active practice of those virtues in a life not unduly beset with 
maladies, catastrophes, hunger, and the like. In insisting on a modicum of amenities 
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Thomas’s writings on ethics (e.g., his analysis of human action) are plainly 
Aristotelian, non-Aristotelian elements dominate at many points, e.g., 
where core Christian notions (grace, salvation, charity, etc.) go beyond 
Aristotle’s pagan this-worldliness.3 The result, I will suggest, is a hybrid 
that on crucial points concerning the nature of both the virtues and happi-
ness is thoroughly un-Aristotelian. That two thinkers from such different 
cultures should diverge on the content of happiness is not surprising. But I 
will point out a consequence of that difference, that is, Aquinas’s tendency 
toward a moral instrumentalism alien in spirit to Aristotle’s ethics.
In the generation following St. Thomas some thinkers, including John 
Duns Scotus, took issue with the eudaimonist framework altogether, argu-
ing that we are called on to do what is right for its own sake, regardless of 
its impact on our happiness. At first glance, Scotus’s contemporary Meister 
Eckhart (ca.1260–1328?) seems to be echoing this view when he advises his 
audience to “live without why,” that is, without a goal. But after sketching 
Aristotle’s eudaimonism (in section 1) and exploring how Thomas’s moral 
theology compares with it (section 2), I will argue that Eckhart is actually 
a kind of eudaimonist. While no less Christian than his fellow Dominican 
Thomas, his ethical views are in a way more faithful than Aquinas’s to the 
spirit of Aristotle. They deserve serious scholarly attention.
i.
Is there in fact, or should there be, a supreme goal in our lives, by reference 
to which we can determine the rightness of our day-to-day actions? Aris-
totle famously thought there is such a goal, happiness (eudaimonia), which 
is not a subjective state of satisfaction, but rather consists in the complete 
fulfillment of our human nature. As essentially rational beings with lives 
that are also sensate and vegetative, our excellence consists in realizing 
to the highest extent possible our distinctive capacities. This is achievable 
only in a virtuous life in which on the one hand practical reason regularly 
controls our sensory impulses (desires and emotions), and—even better, 
though less common—wherein theoretical reason also devotes itself to 
contemplation or study of the highest realities.4 Many of the virtues—e.g., 
justice, courage, generosity, etc.—are largely other-oriented. But in each 
case the role of the virtue in one’s life is self-perfective. So, for instance, 
courage moderates on the one hand natural fears and a tendency to save 
oneself at the expense of others, and on the other an inclination to endan-
ger oneself and others through reckless overconfidence. It is thus a part 
and good fortune, Aristotle differed from other ancient champions of the virtues 
such as Socrates and the Stoics.
3The Aristotelian elements in Thomas’s ethical thought coexist, sometimes un-
easily, with the long tradition of Christian, substantially Augustinian, teaching. 
Thomas’s overall attitude and debts to Aristotle are a topic of ongoing debate, for 
instance about the extent and import of Augustinian and other Neoplatonic influ-
ences on Thomas’s thinking.
4There is scholarly disagreement—which I must ignore here—about how ex-
actly to understand Aristotle’s final view of the relationship between the practical 
and contemplative forms of life.
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of the perfection of human nature in that it honors one’s ties to others, 
e.g., to family, friends or country, ties rooted in our nature as essentially 
social beings. Just as a good carpenter qua carpenter builds houses well in 
fulfilling her function, so too a virtuous human being acts courageously 
because that is fulfilling her function qua human being; she is thus real-
izing her happiness or fulfillment. Eudaimonia is not simply a reward for 
virtuous living; it is living virtuously.
Aristotle’s approach to ethics thus revolves around these central ele-
ments: First, there is the goal (telos) of life. Everyone agrees in calling it 
happiness. Aristotle claims it is a function of our nature, and its attainment 
a matter of our own efforts. Identifying the goal is the same as making it 
the object of one’s will (boulēsis);5 while practical wisdom (phronēsis) enables 
us to discern which of alternative actions available to us will promote at-
tainment of the end. Hence his ethic is broadly teleological, that is, it aims 
to discover, describe, and advocate a process of human development to-
ward the goal of life.
Second, attainment of the goal consists in the performance, the actual 
doing, of actions of a certain kind, that is, those identified by practical wis-
dom as right, in that they contribute to (by partially constituting) one’s 
happiness. Essential to such actions is that they proceed from the right 
sort of principles, that is, from virtues as habits which we develop, and in 
the exercise of which (under the guidance of phronēsis) we live the best of 
human lives. Aristotle distinguishes (e.g., at NE 1094 a 1ff.) action (praxis) 
from production (poiesis); in the latter the “product beyond the activity” is 
the point; in the former, it is the activity itself that matters: a just action is 
a good-in-itself.
A serious danger for any teleological ethical theory is the tendency to 
exalt the end over the means, turning the latter into a mere instrument to 
realizing the former. Aristotle saw this threat of instrumentalization. His 
solution was to make the virtues, friendship, and the like constituents of the 
happy life. Justice, courage, etc. are their own reward, and at the same time 
help constitute the good life by fulfilling our nature as rational animals. If 
we are persuaded by Aristotle about the content of the good life, we do not 
choose to be virtuous in order to achieve happiness as an extrinsic good, 
something beyond. The just person is just because it is right to be so, i.e., 
fully consonant with her nature as a rational, social animal, but her conduct 
is itself a realization of happiness. Indeed, I cannot be just if my action is 
solely (or even principally) meant to attain some extrinsic goal: to instru-
mentalize a virtue is to destroy it (though Aristotle allows that we can act 
justly for its own sake and because to do so partially constitutes our hap-
piness or fulfillment, NE 1097b, 1–7). Such is Aristotle’s teleological eudai-
monism, an ethic built on the notions of attaining the good life (happiness) 
through, and in, the kind of virtuous action which fulfills one’s nature.
5The role, or even presence, of the concept of will in Aristotle’s thought is contro-
versial. I take it that his notion of boulēsis, the inclination toward—or wanting of—
the goal of life, is a central element in the complex medieval concept of voluntas. See 
the discussion in Charles Kahn, “Discovering the Will from Aristotle to Augustine,” 
in The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: studies in later greek philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon 
and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 103—126.
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I propose to compare Aquinas and Eckhart with Aristotle on these ele-
ments: the goal of life, the structure of human action, and the virtues. In 
this process we should bear in mind correspondingly different senses in 
which we might speak of teleology in ethics:
(A) First, an ethic might be concerned with moral development in that it 
conceives as the (or a) central task of ethics to lead one from an unsatisfac-
tory initial state of character to a perfected state (the telos or goal, eudai-
monia, maturity, etc.) in which one is a fully developed moral agent. Call 
this a teleological view of human life. It is typical of, though not exclusive to, 
virtue-ethics.
(B) An ethic might allot an important role to the means-end aspect of 
action in moral conduct. The end could be intrinsic, i.e., living virtuously 
itself, but could equally be something extrinsic to the action, e.g., the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. (Kant’s ethic, by contrast, is 
famously non-teleological in this sense, since its central focus is the agent’s 
motive, and neither her goal nor the consequences of her conduct).
(C) Finally, a teleological ethic might see virtuous action as itself a means 
to a further end. For instance, courage might be conceived as a good thing 
primarily as being in a further way meritorious, where earning this further 
merit from another (or others) is the real goal of life. So it is sometimes 
said that in the “Homeric ethic” the honor or esteem of one’s peers is the 
principal good. When the rightness of actions is derived from their serving 
some such external goal, the resulting ethic is a form of consequentialism. 
As noted, the danger here is an undermining of the virtues.
Aristotle’s eudaimonist ethic is teleological in the first way; and while 
he thinks of virtuous action as a means to happiness, such action’s connec-
tion to happiness is internal and constitutive. I shall argue that Aquinas 
is, in a way, a stronger teleologist than Aristotle: his connection of virtu-
ous action to what he calls “perfect happiness” is external and by way of 
merit. Eckhart, though he has a partially teleological account of our lives, 
differs importantly from Aquinas with respect to each of these senses of 
ethics and teleology, and—crucially—is a non-teleologist about action, in 
one sense, and the virtues.
ii.
When the Nicomachean Ethics first became available in Latin to Christian 
thinkers in the thirteenth century, it elicited strong reactions. Some, but 
not all, were opposed to the study of it in the universities. The Aristote-
lian eudaimonist conception of the good life, while attractively concise 
and powerfully argued, was after all essentially pagan, lacking notions 
of salvation, grace, creation, providence, etc. Without denying this point, 
many wrote commentaries on it. Aquinas did so too, and then incorpo-
rated parts of it into his moral theology.
Among the works of Aquinas addressed to moral themes is his monu-
mental textbook, the summa Theologiae. In the latter, starting in the second 
main part (the prima secundae, or 1a2ae),6 St. Thomas lays out his ethic in 
6Further citations to Thomas will be given in the text, and will refer to the 1a2ae 
unless otherwise noted.
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a format somewhat like Aristotle’s: (a) in the ‘treatise on happiness’ (ar-
ticles 1–5) he investigates the goal of life, that is, happiness or beatitude; 
(b) the ‘treatise of human acts’ (articles 6–21) is his detailed analysis of 
human action, including moral action; (c) the ‘treatises on the passions, 
virtues and vices,’ as well as the Gospel Beatitudes (22–89), present his 
views on the role of these elements in the moral life; while (d) in the 
‘treatise on law’ (90–114) he sets out his influential view of natural law. 
(The following segment of the summa, the secunda secundae, is a detailed 
theological investigation of individual virtues, where charity assumes the 
central place.)
In the ‘treatise on happiness,’ “the centerpiece in the construction of 
the summa Theologiae,”7 Thomas for a while hews closely to Aristotle’s 
argumentation: since “man’s ultimate end is his complete good” (1,6, ad 
3), our happiness cannot consist in wealth, power, sensory pleasure, etc., 
as none of these can fully satisfy our desire. But Aquinas then goes on to 
extend the point to virtue, contemplation or any “created good”: none of 
them, nor all together, can fully satisfy us.8 In thus rejecting the notion 
that a life of the virtues could constitute our happiness, Aquinas steps 
decisively beyond the framework of Aristotle: our longing for fulfillment 
implies that only the eternal possession of God in the Beatific Vision can 
fulfill us (2, 8, resp.). The teleological drive built into our nature points 
inexorably to this as its completion. The happiness we seek can be had 
fully only in that Vision.
Such a completion, however, is beyond the capacity of our nature (5, 5, 
resp.). Hence, from the point of view of virtue ethics, we find ourselves in 
a dilemma: the most our unaided human nature is capable of is a limited 
or “imperfect” (i.e., Aristotelian) happiness in this life; yet we long for a 
perfect happiness that is beyond our means and could only be given us, 
e.g., as a divine reward for our meritorious virtuous behavior. But can 
merit and an extrinsic reward coexist with virtue in a coherent ethic? Aris-
totle thought not, and if we were to follow him, we would have to set aside 
from ethics the Christian promise of salvation. For if salvation, conceived 
as an extrinsic reward for meritorious conduct, is our true goal, the life 
of the virtues is threatened by instrumentalization; yet if our virtues are 
undermined, how can our conduct possibly merit salvation?
We will return to this question, but even at this point it may seem doubt-
ful that Thomas’s approach, while clearly teleological and widely thought 
7Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Beatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinas’s summa 
Theologiae,” in The pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic moral Theology, ed. John 
Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2005), p. 117.
8As Kenny points out, Aristotle’s own conception of happiness vacillates in his 
two major ethical works between the “perfect” good (that best of all activities, that 
is, contemplation) and the “complete” good (that is, a set of activities so satisfy-
ing that nothing could be added to it that would make it more satisfying). Kenny 
contends that Aquinas, though following the former line in his commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes avails himself of the latter, as here in the summa. Cf. 
Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness,” in aquinas’s moral Theory: 
Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 15–27.
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to be eudaimonist,9 can be called “eudaimonist” in Aristotle’s sense. For 
Aristotle the end or fulfillment of human beings consists in virtuous liv-
ing, a form of life which is clearly open to us to choose (and certainly one 
which no one else can give us). It represents the perfection of our human 
nature. But for Christians this conception is at best incomplete. Our true 
ultimate goal is not discoverable by reason, but known only through reve-
lation, and it is not—so Thomas—the perfection of our human nature, but 
rather something “beyond the nature of any created intellect” (1a, 62,1). 
Hence, already in the treatise on happiness a substantial gap is obvious: 
although Thomas uses Aristotle’s overall teleological framework, he must 
dramatically alter Aristotle’s eudaimonism (which indeed no Christian 
could embrace as the full account of our destiny). I will suggest that his al-
terations, when thought through, are so drastic that one must ask whether 
his constellation of positions, i.e., a Christian teleological ethics that is not 
eudaimonist in a sense at least analogous to Aristotle’s, is fully coherent. 
Eckhart, I will argue, does not think so.
With respect to virtuous action, we may note, first, that Thomas’s analy-
sis of human action is more detailed and developed than Aristotle’s, but 
certainly at least as teleological. At the very beginning of the ‘treatise of 
human acts’ (6–21) Aquinas writes:
[E]very agent or thing moved acts or is moved for an end . . . ; those 
things which have a knowledge of the end [such as human beings] 
are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by 
which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, 
since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and 
that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be 
voluntary. (6, 1, resp.)
The same focus on the end or goal of actions is at the heart of Thomas’s 
conception of their moral goodness and badness:
Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, 
so the goodness of a thing depends on its end . . . human actions 
and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, 
have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend. 
(18, 1, resp.)
The “something else” on which “the goodness” of human actions depends 
is the will, with its orientation to the end. For an action to be morally good, 
the will must be intent on the right goal, a basically Aristotelian view. 
However, Thomas’s account of the virtues goes far beyond that of his clas-
sical predecessor.
9“Aquinas holds to an eudaimonistic ‘moral point of view’ . . . ,” Denis Bradley, 
aquinas on the Twofold human good: Reason and human happiness in aquinas’s moral 
science (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 53. Also: 
“St. Thomas adopted a similar [i.e., to Aristotle’s] eudaemonological (sic) and te-
leological standpoint . . . ,” Frederick Copleston, S.J., a history of philosophy, Vol. 2, 
mediaeval philosophy, part ii (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1962), p. 119.
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Measured simply by the sheer volume of the attention given to the vir-
tues in his summa, Thomas is clearly a virtue-ethicist. But as we saw, he 
characterizes Aristotle’s version of eudaimonia as imperfect: a life of the 
virtues cannot satisfy our deepest longing. Are we, then, what Sartre called 
“a useless passion,” yearning for something we cannot attain?10 Thomas of 
course thinks not. The Christian promise that the just will see God “face to 
face” [I Corinthians, 13:12] must imply that our nature can be transformed 
so as to become capable of this Beatific Vision. In the process of this trans-
formation we receive the divine gift of grace in the form of supernatural 
(“theological”) virtues that enable us to act meritoriously.11 The gist of his 
view on grace can be put this way: for us to attain the completion we long 
for in the Beatific Vision, we require God’s supernatural assistance in the 
form both of a permanent alteration or restoration of our nature (sanctify-
ing grace), and of ongoing assistance in the formation of the will and the 
execution of actions (actual grace).
Let us return to the dilemma mentioned above. Thomas’s eudaimo-
nism seems marked by a kind of instrumentalism: the goal of the Beatific 
Vision is extrinsic to, and a reward for, the virtuous life. Is he then “an 
egoistic rationalist,” someone for whom the point of virtuous behavior is 
to be rewarded for it?12 A charge of egoism cannot really touch Aristotle, 
if we understand egoism to be in tension with virtuous living. For Aris-
totle, the virtuous life is in fact the one most suited to the real interests 
of the individual, so justice for example cannot truly conflict with genu-
ine self-interest. But the plausibility of this claim is rooted in Aristotle’s 
view that living virtuously is itself the perfection of our nature: instru-
mentalism has no toe-hold here. Not entirely so, for Thomas; on his view 
the perfection of our nature is two-fold. Something like Aristotle’s view 
may be right at the inferior “natural” level, but our inborn teleology 
points beyond the sphere of nature: “Our heart is restless until it rests 
in You,” according to the famous prayer of Augustine (Confessions, 1, 1). 
We want more.
But neither is it quite right to call Thomas an egoist. For Aquinas, the 
principal form grace takes in us is charity, the greatest of the theologi-
cal virtues. Thomas means by charity no mere disposition to alms-giving 
and the like, but nothing less than a form of the love with which God 
10The phrase appears in part 4, chapter 1 of Being and Nothingness, 1943.
11Aquinas’s teachings on the topic of grace “are complex and difficult to follow,” 
and their development over the course of his mature years reflects “his growing 
pessimism over humanity’s natural faculties,” according to Alister McGrath, Justi-
tia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd edition, 2005), p. 136. I restrict myself here to Thomas’s ma-
ture view in the summa.
12I borrow the phrase (in a slightly altered sense) from Scott MacDonald, “Egois-
tic Rationalism: Aquinas’s Basis for Christian Morality,” in Christian Theism and the 
problems of philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990), pp. 327–354. Put perhaps over simply, MacDonald’s view is 
that for Thomas human beings naturally seek their own complete good, and they 
do so by means of the exercise of intellect and will. A critique of this position can 
be found in chapter 3 of Thomas Osborne, love of self and love of god in Thirteenth-
Century Ethics (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
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loves Himself, i.e., a love of God for God’s own perfect goodness, a love 
beyond ordinary human ability and—very importantly—not self-serving. 
As Brian Davies puts it, “by charity we share in what God is from eternity 
insofar as we love God in the way God loves God . . . it is the presence [in 
us] of the Holy Spirit because it is caused by the Holy Spirit, who thereby 
produces in us what love is in God.”13 Charity enables us to act in selfless 
ways that are by definition done for the love of God, not for the sake of a 
reward, though such acts merit the Beatific Vision.
The Christian revelation points to an avenue that leads to a perfect beat-
itude undreamt of by the ancients: God offers to make us deiform, “partici-
pants in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:3 f.). As a result those who are saved 
can, in patria, enjoy a knowledge of the divine essence, while in this life (in 
via) God’s grace blesses them with faith, hope and charity, each of which 
gives a foretaste of the joys of heaven. Indeed, these three “theological vir-
tues” so transform the lives of the faithful that even those virtues praised 
by the ancients are made new, inspiring just or courageous actions that are 
now performed from charity, i.e., from the love of God for God’s own sake. 
This, then, is the best life possible for human beings in via, a life in which 
we perform virtuous and meritorious deeds out of charity.
Such a life can hardly be called egoism. But has Thomas then, in de-
scribing the graced lives of the truly faithful, thereby avoided ethical in-
strumentalism altogether? Is his system a variant on that of Aristotle, who 
as we saw thought of virtuous behavior as done for its own sake and for 
the sake of happiness? Can we read him as saying that an action is meri-
torious (and that God rewards that action in the Beatific Vision), while 
at the same time the agent does not undertake it as a means to this end? 
Indeed, could we not say the action is meritorious precisely because it is 
not intended as a means to any further end?14
Although Thomas sometimes seems to suggest such a non-instrumen-
tal view of the theologically virtuous life, it is not his main point. In the 
Question on the theological virtues (62) he claims they “direct man to su-
pernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is 
directed to his connatural end.” In particular, by hope “the will is directed 
to this [supernatural] end . . . as something attainable” (62, 3, resp., emphases 
added). In this life, we believe by faith in the possibility of the Beatific Vi-
sion; we are inspired by grace to hope for it; by grace we perform actions 
meritorious of it (109, 5, ad 1); while by charity, i.e., the divine love itself 
in us through grace, we enjoy a certain anticipation of the union we hope 
for in the life to come. In other words, we are meant to aspire to the Beatific 
Vision, an aspiration which we know can only be fulfilled as a reward for 
our merits.
My point can be made in another way, i.e., by asking, is this life of the 
theological virtues itself our beatitudo, our happiness? It is clearly the best 
we can hope for in this life, and so we must think of it as a certain level 
of happiness. But surely a Thomist Christian should be disappointed if 
13Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
pp. 288–289.
14I am indebted for this important question to an anonymous reviewer for this 
journal.
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this were “all” she were to attain. For although her Christian life is the 
best one possible in via, and is to an extent chosen for its own sake, she 
certainly also wants above all the Beatific Vision: it represents her deep-
est desire. The theological virtues, for all Thomas’s talk of “for their own 
sake,” are essentially aimed at attaining a Good beyond themselves, an 
end state which Thomas repeatedly speaks of as a “reward.”15 Such an 
ethic, while not egoistic, is nonetheless clearly consequentialist. But this 
creates an unavoidable, and perhaps untenable, tension. The Christian 
is in effect told by Thomas that, God willing, her deepest desire will be 
fulfilled, but only if she succeeds in both letting and not letting it motivate 
her actions.
On reflection, one might wonder if anything besides some kind of conse-
quentialism is possible for a medieval Christian moral philosopher within 
the broadly eudaimonistic framework. Duns Scotus, as mentioned earlier, 
anticipated more modern developments by rejecting (or curtailing) eudai-
monism itself. But Meister Eckhart did not. Yet he speaks of “living with-
out why.” What could that mean? Let us turn now to see.
iii.
Thus far we have seen some important similarities and differences be-
tween the virtue-ethical systems of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Each 
seeks to be a eudaimonist, viewing the goal of happiness as something to 
be achieved through a process of acquiring (or otherwise coming to pos-
sess) various virtues; and each thinks of action, conceived in means-end 
terms, as occupying a crucial place in the quest for the happy life. The 
principal difference between them, we saw, lies in their respective concep-
tions of the virtues (what they are, how we come to have them), and their 
place in the happy life. For Aristotle, they are excellences of mind and 
character acquired by education and effort, and the virtuous life consti-
tutes eudaimonia; while for Thomas even a life of the divinely infused vir-
tues is inferior to, and preparatory for, the reward of bliss that awaits the 
just in Heaven. In Meister Eckhart we encounter a third, and importantly 
different, version of virtue-eudaimonism.
Eckhart von Hochheim, born in Thuringia around 1260 when Thomas 
was coming into his prime, became an eminent philosopher / theologian 
and one of Aquinas’s successors on the Dominican chair for theology at 
the University of Paris. He was accorded the unusual honor of appoint-
ment to this rotating chair twice (1302–1303 and 1311–1313). In between 
he held important administrative posts in his order. After completing his 
second professorship, Eckhart was given special pastoral assignments by 
his superiors that called for much vernacular preaching in the Rhineland. 
15As Joseph Wawrykow says, “When speaking of merit [in Question 114] 
Thomas repeatedly refers to the life of the Christian as a ‘journey’ or ‘movement.’ 
The basic idea here is that the Christian life is a journey in which one who is in 
grace moves further away from sin and draws nearer to God through the good 
actions / merits one performs. Eventually the Christian will attain in this way the 
ultimate destination of this journey, god himself.” In god’s grace and human action 
(Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 267, n. 13, emphasis 
added.
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As one of the first to put philosophical and theological terminology into 
Middle High German, he became a celebrated, indeed notorious figure in 
the pulpit. In the religious turbulence of the early fourteenth century he 
was eventually accused of heresy and tried before the Inquisition. In 1329 
Pope John XXII, who had canonized Thomas Aquinas a few years before, 
condemned as heretical or misleading twenty-eight propositions from 
Eckhart’s writings, a substantial number of which expressed his criticisms 
of aspects of teleological ethics.16
Although generally regarded as a Neoplatonist on whom the works of 
Augustine had an enormous impact, “there is,” as Bernard McGinn has 
pointed out, “no philosopher [Eckhart] knew better or cited more often 
than Aristotle.”17 Furthermore, he quotes St. Thomas hundreds of times, 
especially in his Latin writings. And Eckhart repeatedly uses the standard 
Aristotelian framework of final causality, often as a source of comparisons 
between the workings of nature and the human quest for happiness. A 
typical example is the opening paragraph of his Latin Commentary on John 
1, 43, sequere me (“Follow me”):
First of all one must know that through the creation God says and 
proclaims, advises and orders all creatures—precisely by creating 
them—to follow Him, the First Cause of their entire being, to orient 
themselves to Him, to return to Him and hurry to Him according to 
the Scripture: “To the place from which the waters flow they shall 
return” [Ecclesiates, I, 7]. This is why the creature by its nature loves 
God, indeed more than itself.18
But if “all creatures” are meant to “orient themselves” to God, “to re-
turn to Him and hurry to Him,” it is surprising that Eckhart seems to 
criticize teleological conceptions of the good life, especially as the official 
Dominican theologian, Aquinas, had so extensively and authoritatively 
formulated one such conception during Eckhart’s own lifetime. Eckhart’s 
flat and repeated rejection of an intuitively plausible approach to such 
a centrally important issue, namely how we should live, is unusual and 
surprising.19 His rejection is furthermore often couched in memorable 
16The Papal Bull in agro dominico of March 27, 1329 is available in English in 
meister Eckhart: The Essential sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and defense, trans. 
and intro. E. Colledge, O.S.A. and B. McGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981). Ar-
ticles 7 through 22 deal with Eckhart’s views on how we should live. The Bull 
denounces Eckhart in harsh terms. But in 1985 Pope John Paul II, himself a phi-
losopher, spoke approvingly of Eckhart’s central teachings.
17Bernard McGinn, The mystical Thought of meister Eckhart (New York: Cross-
road Publishing, 2001), p. 168.
18Meister Eckhart, lateinische Werke (hereafter lW—the German works, deutsche 
Werke, are cited as dW—Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1936—), vol. 3, p. 189. 
Further references are given in brackets in the text. The English translations are, 
unless otherwise noted, from M. O’C. Walshe, meister Eckhart: sermons and Trea-
tises, 3 volumes (Shaftsbury [Dorset]: Element Books, 1979, 1981, 1987).
19Eckhart’s critique, in both German and Latin works, of teleological eudaimo-
nism is never explicitly stated as a criticism of Thomas or Aristotle. He comes close 
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(and what seems deliberately provocative) imagery—at one point he calls 
those who think of salvation in teleological terms esel (“asses”).
We begin, as before, with the central question of the goal of life. Eck-
hart could say with Aristotle that we want to be happy, that our happi-
ness is a function of our nature, and that we are initially de facto ignorant 
of what it consists in. He agrees too that its attainment requires effort 
on our part. So Eckhart’s ethic, as with Aristotle and Thomas, is broadly 
teleological, that is, it aims to discover, describe, and advocate a process 
of human development toward the goal of life. It is also a virtue ethic, 
since justice and the like play a central role. But he gives all these ideas a 
radical twist. In vernacular sermon 1, Jesus intravit in templum (“Jesus en-
tered the Temple,” dW 1, 4 ff.), Eckhart preaches on the Gospel text (Mat-
thew 21:12) which tells of Jesus driving the merchants from the temple. 
After identifying, in typically allegorical fashion,20 the temple with the 
(highest part of the) soul, Eckhart asks what the Evangelist meant by the 
merchants in the temple / soul. He answers that the merchants (and he 
explicitly says he means here “none but good people”) are those whose 
inclination it is to
do good works to the glory of God, such as fasts, vigils, prayers and 
the rest, all kinds of good works, but [to] do them in order that our 
Lord may give them something in return, or that God may do some-
thing they wish for—all these are merchants. That is plain to see, for 
they want to give one thing in exchange for another, and so to barter 
with our Lord. (p. 7)
Eckhart’s counterpart to the “spiritual merchant”21 is the “just person” (der 
gerehte, in his Middle High German). In sermon 6, Justi vivent in aeternum 
(“The just shall live forever,” dW 1, 99 ff.), Eckhart explains that the just 
person is one “who gives to God His due, and to the saints and angels 
theirs, and to his fellow man what is his.” It is in the first of these that the 
contrast to the merchant most strikingly emerges:
God’s due is honor. Who are they who honor God? Those who have 
gone completely out of themselves and seek not their own in any-
thing at all, whatever it may be, whether great or small; who pay 
special heed to nothing anywhere, neither above nor below nor next 
to nor on themselves; who aim not at possessions or honors or com-
to doing so, however, in German sermon 101, where he declares the superiority of 
complete detachment (“to keep still and silent . . . and let God speak and work”) to 
a more active, one could say Aristotelian or Thomist, form of contemplation (“to 
do something . . . to imagine and think about God”). dW 4, vol. 1, p. 354; Walshe, 
vol. 1, p. 6.
20I have discussed Eckhart’s hermeneutical approach in “applicatio and Explica-
tio in Gadamer and Eckhart,” in gadamer’s Century: Essays in honor of hans-georg 
gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge MA 
and London: The MIT Press, 2002).
21Eckhart appears to have principally in mind those monks, nuns, and others 
who think that their ascetic practices will assure salvation for themselves.
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fort or pleasure or utility or inwardness or holiness or reward or heav-
en; and who have renounced all of this, all that is theirs. From such 
people God has honor, and they honor God in the proper sense and 
give Him his due. (p. 100, emphasis added)
Again, in sermon 41, Qui sequitur justitiam (“They who pursue justice,” 
dW 2), Eckhart says:
[The just man] wants and seeks nothing, for he knows no why. He 
acts without a why just in the same way as God does; and just as life 
lives for its own sake and seeks no why for the sake of which it lives, 
so too the just man knows no why for the sake of which he would do 
something. (pp. 288–289)
Again, we are told in sermon 6 that the truly just differ from those who 
merely “want what God wants . . . but [who] if they should fall sick, would 
wish it were God’s will that they should be better;” by contrast, “the just 
have no will at all: whatever God wills, it is all one to them, however great 
the hardship” (p. 102, emphasis added). Such people “are so set on justice 
that if God were not just they would not care a bean for God” (p. 103); fur-
ther, “whoever understands about the just man and justice understands 
all that I am saying” (p. 105). What does all this mean?
For Aristotle, the just or virtuous life is itself (a central aspect of) hap-
piness, so in a sense he too could say, “The just man wants and seeks 
nothing [other than justice], he knows no why” in acting virtuously. For 
Thomas, on the other hand, although the just person does what is just 
for its own sake, such behavior does not constitute complete happiness; 
at best it may merit it. Thus, in his moral theology a door is (perhaps 
inadvertently) opened to spiritual or ethical mercantilism, to virtuous 
behavior as a means of barter. And it is this door that Eckhart means 
to close, even though such behavior was (and still is) regularly encour-
aged by the Church. What does Eckhart think is lacking in behavior that, 
to ordinary common sense, not to mention the Church hierarchy, seems 
commendable? And why does he dwell on “going out of oneself,” else-
where identified as detachment (abegescheidenheit), of which he says in 
the treatise “On Detachment” that it “surpasses all things, for all virtues 
have some regard to creatures, but detachment is free of all creatures” 
(dW 5, p. 405)?
For Eckhart, what is wrong with the merchant mentality in the search 
for eudaimonia is that merchants have made the most fundamental of 
mistakes, i.e., who—or what—God is, and thus what they are themselves: 
knowledge of these things is essential if one is to know what eudaimonia 
consists in. In his Latin Commentary on the gospel of John, Eckhart sees in 
the Gospel’s opening passage, “in principio erat verbum . . . ,” (usually 
rendered: “In the beginning was the Word . . . ”) a confirmation of his 
radical Parisian thesis of 1302: deus est intelligere, (“God is understand-
ing / thinking”—as opposed to: being, as Thomas taught—lW 5, p. 40). 
“in principio erat verbum” he renders as: the Word was in the principle 
(or source), i.e., in God. A word (verbum, logos) presupposes a mind, 
and a mind is constituted by, i.e., is nothing but, its thinking (knowing, 
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understanding).22 Trading on the other meaning of logos, i.e., idea, Eckhart 
also takes the phrase as declaring the priority of the idea (or form) over 
its exempla: the idea (or form) that defines the exempla is found first and 
foremost “in the principle,” the pure Idea. Further, the form or idea in the 
exemplum is the same (only more eminently) in the principle as in the ex-
emplum or product (also called “son,” i.e., “offspring,” a locution Eckhart 
particularly likes, and which implies that the principle is “father”). In his 
doctrine of the transcendental perfections (being, unity, truth, goodness, 
but sometimes also wisdom and justice) Eckhart can thus identify the 
perfections with God, as God’s “proper attributes” (propria)—he says, for 
instance, esse est deus, i.e., being is most truly said of God, not of crea-
tures.23 He can also claim that their manifestations, e.g., a just person (jus-
tus), are not distinct from Justice itself, insofar as (inquantum) s / he is just: 
the justice that such a person manifests is the same justice that itself is 
God. What Eckhart is saying here about goodness itself and justice itself 
is part of his understanding of analogy: a perfection such as goodness is 
properly present only in God, while the goodness of the good person is 
‘adopted’; goodness itself is the original (or Principle), and the adopted 
goodness manifested in the person, character, or behavior of the good 
person is an image or offspring of it. This is not to identify the concrete, 
individual just person with God, which would make no sense; but it does 
imply that, were this person to detach from her particularities (her propria 
or individual properties) and recognize as her true reality what she shares 
with the Principle, she would become, to that extent, “God’s Offspring,” 
and hence indistinct from God, her Source.24
Thus the just person, insofar as she is just, “acts without a why in the 
same way as God does,” since she is in this way not distinct from God. But 
the spiritual merchant, who acts for a why, ipso facto fails to be just, and 
does not give God His due. Nor does the merchant give himself his own 
due, since he mistakenly pins his hopes of salvation on his own particular 
(teleologically oriented) efforts, whereas in fact these directly impede his 
progress, since they reinforce the very thing that separates us from God, 
our belief in our own metaphysical autonomy as the spatio-temporal indi-
viduals we take ourselves to be. In reality, whether we realize it or not, we 
are literally nothing without God, and as human beings are one with God 
in “the ground of the soul.” Thus to act out of this truest self is eo ipso to 
do God’s will, not our own, and to act justly. God never acts as a merchant, 
22Eckhart takes his inspiration here from Aristotle, who wrote of the mind that 
“it is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing” (de anima 429a24). Thus, for 
Eckhart, it is above, prior to, being.
23“Being is God” is the first proposition in the general prologue to the Tripartite 
Work, lW 1, p. 156. In the Commentary on John Eckhart remarks that being, one, true 
and good are God’s “domestic servants,” whereas for creatures these perfections 
are “guests and foreigners.” lW 3, pp. 83–84.
24This doctrine of the transcendentals is also spelled out, with a strong focus on 
the moral virtues (goodness, justice), in the mature German treatise liber ‘Benedic-
tus’ where Eckhart says, e.g., “Goodness begets itself and all that it is in the good 
man, and the good man receives all his being, knowledge, love and energy from 
the heart and inmost depth of goodness, and from that alone. The good man and 
goodness are nothing but one goodness . . . ” dW 5, p. 9.
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seeking something further—for what could God lack? “He is perfectly free 
in His acts, which he does out of true love. So too does a person who is one 
with God: she is perfectly free in her acts, she does them for love, without 
‘why’—solely to glorify God and not seeking her own therein, and God 
works in her” (dW 1, p. 9).
In our everyday lives, we are (and are surrounded by) persons who are 
at best intermittently good and just. If manifesting these characteristics is, 
or is connected, somehow with the goal of life, what does it take to become 
and to be good (just, wise, etc.) as God is? On Eckhart’s view, this is not 
self-evident, though he thinks the truth of it was discovered by some of 
the ancient pagan philosophers and is also revealed in Scripture (for those 
who have the art to read it properly). The key lies in a practice foreign 
to Aristotle. Indeed, the extent of Eckhart’s departure from Aristotelian-
ism shows itself in the supreme value he puts on detachment (sometimes 
called humility or obedience).25 For Eckhart detachment, or “turning deci-
sively to God,” is a propaedeutic to genuine virtue. For it is only by taking 
leave of our attachment to a false conception of ourselves that we are able 
to live the genuine life of happiness and virtue. Hence the crucial step in 
the quest for eudaimonia is less about doing (as in Aristotle and Aquinas) 
than undoing.
Detachment is an acknowledgement that—and this is the teleological 
element in Eckhart’s conception of the good life—we can (and must) “go 
out” of our everyday way of thinking, turn away from creaturely multi-
plicity in order to achieve or accept our fulfillment. According to Genesis 
I, 26, we humans alone were created “in God’s own image and likeness.” 
Since it is God’s nature to be incomparable (that is, “like to nothing else”) 
and free, we too must become “like to nothing” and “free” by detaching 
our minds from identification with our finite particularities, what Eck-
hart repeatedly calls our eigenschaften, literally “properties” (propria), our 
personal characteristics and rootedness in the particularities of time and 
space.26 For Eckhart, human nature in its truth is what one might call a 
form of emptiness, an image of the Divine Emptiness (as intelligere), and the 
attempt to conform one’s actual self to one’s essential nature is the crucial 
first step on the road to fulfillment.27 For, “Whenever a man in obedience 
25Eckhart in various places gives a variety of names to the “ground-act” in which 
one turns decisively toward God, e.g., calling it “humility” (in German sermons 
14, 15, 16b, 54a, 55), “obedience” in the Talks of instruction, etc. Cf. Theo Kobusch, 
“Mystik als Metaphysik des moralischen Seins,” in abendländische mystik im mit-
telalter: symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984, ed. Kurt Ruh (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986, hereafter mystik), p. 53.
26“God’s being is like nothing; in it is neither image nor form” (dW 1, p. 107). 
Eckhart, unlike Thomas, agrees with Moses Maimonides and various Neopla-
tonists that no positive assertions at all can be made of God. He speaks instead, 
in his commentary on Exodus, of the negatio negationis as the “purest and fullest 
affirmation” (lW 2, p. 77, line 11). The matter is discussed in Burkhard Mojsisch, 
meister Eckhart: analogy, univocity, and unity, hereafter analogy, trans., preface and 
appendix by Orrin F. Summerell (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 
2001), chap. 5.
27Alessandra Beccarisi stresses this developmental aspect of Eckhart’s ethics 
in her commentary on sermon 1. Eckhart calls to our attention “the intellectual 
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goes out of his own and gives up what is his, in the same moment God 
must go in there.”28
If indeed “God and I are one,” in Eckhart’s special sense (a thesis never 
espoused by Aquinas, much less Aristotle), then the realization of this 
unity is of the highest importance. According to Dietmar Mieth, Eckhart 
teaches that “one should not locate happiness in the beatific vision, but 
rather in the unity [with God] in being” itself.29 But whether we recognize 
it or not, this unity is already ours. Of course since, as Eckhart wrote, “be-
ing is God,” there is no question of any ontological separation from our 
Source. But as rational beings, the crucial thing for us is the consciousness 
of this unity, an awareness that need not involve any visionary experi-
ence, but which is the core of what is often (and perhaps misleadingly) 
called Eckhart’s “mysticism.” In any event, achieving this awareness is 
the decisive step toward our eudaimonia, and it is taken by changing our 
minds through detachment.
But eudaimonia does not end with the fact, or even the blissful realiza-
tion, of this oneness. As the highest virtues—goodness, justice, wisdom—
are identified as transcendental realities with God,30 the newly aware 
person recognizes that his unity with God amounts to a unity with these 
virtues themselves. As Rolf Schönberger puts it, “The unity of man with 
God is thus an ontological fact and at the same time a norm. Now it is first 
and foremost from this fact that the peculiar structure of what one calls 
‘mystical ethics’ results . . . the ‘should’ [of ethics] follows not only from 
man’s goal-determined being,”31 that is, from his final cause (as in Aristo-
tle), but also and especially from his inner nature or formal cause, which 
is his emptiness and freedom as the image of God. Thus Schönberger can 
speak of “Eckhart’s ontologizing of ethics.”32
experience of a person who has understood the nothingness of his creaturely di-
mension, and who seeks for his being a firmer ground, which of course can be 
found in none of the creaturely dimensions. . . . And here this person comes to the 
following conclusion: he understands that God is the ground, the substance, and 
being of his own soul. . . . Man receives his entire being from God alone, but not 
as being-for-itself or as being that belongs to itself, but as being-from-God.” “Zu 
Predigt 1: intravit Jesus in templum,” in lectura Eckhardi ii. predigten meister Eckharts 
von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet, ed. Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer Verlag, 2003, hereafter lectura ii), pp. 19–20.
28The Talks of instruction, dW 5, p. 187.
29In “zu Predigt 86: intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum,” in lectura ii, p. 165. Mi-
eth is referring to the German treatise, The Nobleman, dW 5, p. 117, lines 19–21, 
where Eckhart writes: “So too, I say, the nobleman takes and draws his entire be-
ing, his life, and his happiness simply from God alone, with God, and in God, and 
not from knowing-God, or the vision of God, or loving-God and the like.”
30“It has been written that a virtue is no virtue unless it comes from God or 
through God: one of these things must always be. If it were otherwise, it would 
not be a virtue; for whatever one seeks without God is too small. Virtue is God or 
without mediation in God.” (Sermon 41, dW 2, p. 296)
31Rolf Schönberger, “secundum rationem esse: Zur Ontologisierung der Ethik 
bei Meister Eckhart,” in ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣΙΣ: Festschrift für Robert Spaemann, ed. Reinhard 
Löw, (acta humaniora, Weinheim: VCH, 1987), p. 262, hereafter Festschrift.
32A clear statement of this ontologizing is Eckhart’s “virtue is God,” (see note 30).
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Since Eckhart’s focus on the realization of our ultimate unity with God 
as our blessedness is intimately connected with his unusual approach to 
the virtues, and since these two together explain his initially baffling in-
junction to “live without why,” I proceed next to his treatment of virtue. 
In a passage from his Commentary on the gospel of John Eckhart describes 
goodness as a state of being:
In every good work there are two things to consider, the inner and 
the outer act. The former is in the soul, in the will, and it is this that is 
truly praiseworthy, meritorious and divine, and God brings it about 
in us . . . this is the act of virtue, which makes both the person who 
has it and also the external act good. . . . The inner act, which is 
divine, can be neither interrupted nor hindered; it is constantly at 
work, neither sleeping nor slumbering, but watching over the person 
who possesses it. (lW 3, pp. 510–511)
He then proceeds to give as “an appropriate example” of the “inner act” 
the inclination of a stone to fall, i.e., a formal cause.33 Just as a stone’s natu-
ral heaviness can be impeded by “hindrance” and by what Aristotle called 
“violent motion,” so too our “God-formedness” can be impeded, violated 
when we allow ourselves to be distracted by the particularities of life and 
our own finite, self-centered purposes, what Eckhart sums up laconically 
as “hoc et hoc.” But when we “go out” of our (finite) selves, then, as Eckhart 
puts it, “God must go in there.” But with the entrance of God into the 
soul, the soul “becomes by grace of adoption what the Son is by nature” 
(lW 3, p. 90). Whereupon, in Eckhart’s most famous image, “The Father 
bears His Son in the inmost source,” that is, in the shared ground of both 
God and the soul; “out of that the Holy Spirit blossoms forth, and then 
there arises in God a will that belongs to the soul” (5b, dW 1, pp. 93f.). 
This “birth of God’s Son in the soul” thus transforms the finite, historical 
individual’s self-awareness to become that of an image of the divine and 
thus a fountain of virtue who, like God, performs just / good / wise deeds 
simply because they are just / good / wise. Virtuous acts “pour forth” from 
such an individual with no further goal or purpose in mind. Their role in 
the drama of salvation is never that of means to the end (a role they play, 
in part, in Thomas), nor that of constituting the goal (Aristotle), but are 
rather a manifestation of the goal’s already having been attained.34
Unlike Thomas, Eckhart does not lay much stress on the distinction 
between “infused” and “acquired” virtues: all genuine virtues are really in 
God, and in us only by grace (in this they differ from our very being only 
in that they require that we “go out of our creatureliness,” i.e., detach).35 
He says in his sermons and lectures on Ecclesiasticus:
33In the Aristotelian physics of that time gravity was seen as an intrinsic prop-
erty of objects, essential to their corporeality.
34“In place of a guarantee [of salvation] via works, we have in them the ex-
pression of the Guarantor and of what has been guaranteed [i.e., salvation]: the 
imprinted seal.” Mieth, in lectura ii, p. 173.
35Eckhart’s treatment of grace with respect to virtue has thus far received sur-
prisingly little scholarly attention.
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[B]eing and every perfection, particularly the general ones such as 
being, oneness, truth, goodness, light, justice and the like are said 
analogously of God and creatures. From this it follows that good-
ness, justice, and the like [in creatures] have their goodness entirely 
from a being outside of themselves, that is, God, to which they stand 
in an analogous relationship. (lW 2, p. 281)
And a few pages earlier:
Every finite being . . . has its being not from itself, but from a superior 
being for which it thirsts, hungers, and longs. . . . Thus it thirsts for 
the presence of the superior, and one can more properly say that it 
continually receives its being than that it has it as its own fixed or 
even partially fixed possession. (lW 2, p. 274)
From the vantage-point of one’s own finite being, one can mistakenly 
think one has in oneself a firm and fixed just character, just as one is 
tempted to think of oneself as an autonomous substance in one’s own 
right.36 What is at first glance puzzling is that Eckhart seems to be deny-
ing that the just person really is just, as we usually understand this in 
terms of a habit (acquired or infused). He is aware of this problem, and 
seeks to allay the worry:
What we want to say is that the virtues—justice and the like—are 
something more like gradually proceeding conformations than 
something impressed and remaining firmly rooted in the virtuous 
person. They are in a constant becoming, like the luster of light in 
its medium and the image in a mirror. (Commentary on the Book of 
Wisdom, lW 2, p. 368)
The metaphor of the “image” is a particular favorite with Eckhart, since 
the image is totally dependent for its being on the item imaged.
The person who has “gone out of herself” has given up the notion that 
her eudaimonia is a matter of fulfilling her particular purposes, be they 
banal and everyday or sublime and far-reaching. But it would be mistaken 
to think that she is meant to withdraw into quietism or non-action. We 
shall look more closely in a moment at the unusual notion of living and 
acting “without why,” but for now we should note that to the extent she 
is unified with justice (for example), the just person acts justly, even as 
the released stone falls because of its “inner act.” Paradoxical as it may 
sound, just (and good and wise) action becomes natural to such a person 
precisely in her state of detachment. Eckhart’s “mysticism” has no more 
to do with avoiding the world than with “mystical experiences,” but it has 
36Both assumptions would, incidentally, be true on Thomas’s understanding 
of analogy, according to which it is equally true to say that God is and that I am, 
though the verb ‘to be’ is used analogously, not univocally, in the two cases. Cf., 
e.g., summa Theologiae 1a, 13, 5; whereas Eckhart says that “God alone properly 
speaking exists and is called being, one, true and good,” Tabula prologorum, lW 1, 
p. 132.
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much to do with the realization of one’s unity with God and its results in 
action: as Mieth notes, Eckhart “anticipated the idea of the just person as 
an in actione contemplativus.”37
Mieth has written extensively on the active aspect of Eckhart’s thought.38 
He points out that Eckhart has given us two examples of such “active con-
templatives.” One was Martha (of the Gospel story of Martha and Mary, 
Luke 10, 38–42), the other, St. Elisabeth of Hungary. Eckhart could say of 
each that she was “so well grounded in her essence that her activity was 
no hindrance to her.” Of Elisabeth he tells his audience:
when her outward comforts failed her, she fled to Him to whom all 
creatures flee, setting at naught the world and self. In that way she 
transcended self and scorned the scorn of men, so that it did not 
touch her and she lost none of her perfection. Her desire was to wash 
and tend sick and filthy people with a pure heart.39
Eckhart seems to have wanted, here and in the very first sermon (dW 1, p. 
1) cited above, to counter certain forms of ascetic spiritual practice. When 
Elisabeth wanted to renounce her title and her wealth, she was prevented, 
but these worldly advantages (a kind of particularity or “hoc et hoc” for 
Eckhart) meant nothing to her and so she could use them without attach-
ment in the cause of justice and compassion. In sermon 86 it is not Mary, 
the sister who famously sits at the feet of Jesus to absorb everything he 
says, but rather Martha, who busily tends to the needs of the guest and 
the household, who exemplifies “groundedness in the essence,” and from 
that ground does her good works.
Let us turn now to the notion of action itself in order to consider Eck-
hart’s striking injunction to “live without why.” How is that possible if 
meaningful action can, for the most part, only be conceived in teleologi-
cal, that is, means-end, terms? When we ask an agent why she did this 
or that, we often expect to be told her goal or intention in what she did. 
And yet Eckhart says, in sermon 5b: “If you were to ask a genuine man 
who acted from his own ground, ‘Why do you act?’ if he were to answer 
properly he would simply say, ‘I act because I act.’” But in real life such an 
answer would likely be regarded as either disingenuous or a rebuff to the 
questioner. Could Eckhart seriously be proposing that we eliminate the 
teleological framework altogether?
37In lectura ii, p. 164. The Latin epithet comes from Jerónimo Nadal, a six-
teenth century Jesuit who advocated being contemplative in prayer and likewise 
in action.
38In addition to the works cited directly in this essay, see also his die Einheit 
von vita activa und vita contemplativa in den deutschen predigten und Traktaten meister 
Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1969).
39The first quoted sentence is from Sermon 86 (dW 3, p. 491). The sermon 
treats of Jesus’ visit to the home of Martha and Mary, in which Eckhart portrays 
the “contemplatively active” Martha as the one who deserves the highest praise; 
the second citation is from Sermon 32 on St. Elisabeth (dW 2, p. 147), a royal 
woman of the 13th c. who was devoted to the poor and the sick, and became their 
patroness.
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No, I think not. Take again the example of the stone, whose inner in-
clination is realized by falling in the appropriate circumstances. So too 
the good / just / wise person’s inclinations are realized, as Kobusch says, in 
“the concrete moral action,” which “is characterized by the fact that it has 
its meaning in itself. Just as God performs all his works ‘without a why,’ 
and life is lived for its own sake, without needing to seek for a purpose 
outside of itself, so too the moral person as such acts ‘without a why,’ 
because he regards his activity as meaningful and purposeful in itself, an 
effect of the birth of the Son in the person.”40 Eckhart’s “ontologization” 
of ethics, his stress on what we are and thus how we should act, forces 
us to distinguish between the inner act and the outer act: if an agent has 
“gone out” of her everyday self and recognized her true identity in the 
divine Source, then her ‘inner act’ has become justice, while her outer act 
is its concretization in given empirical circumstances, e.g., St. Elisabeth’s 
attending to the needs of a particular poor person. For Eckhart, what is 
moral per se about her action is the inner act; indeed, the same outer act 
(say, alms-giving) could be performed by a “spiritual merchant,” but since 
it would not be performed for its own sake, i.e., from justice, it would not 
express a virtue.
I want to suggest that what Eckhart means by the “inner act” of the 
just person, in spite of the associations of the term in modern philosophy, 
is not the agent’s intention. Indeed, the intention is an integral part of the 
outer act; it makes the outer act the spatio-temporal particular that it is, 
e.g., taking care of a sick person. Eckhart’s “inner act,” by contrast, is (part 
of) the agent’s nature, as seen in the example of the stone and its inclina-
tion to fall. Our human nature “by adoption” (i.e., by grace) is an image or 
offspring of the divine nature. It hence can express itself outwardly only in 
acts of virtue, that is, acts of justice, goodness, etc., marked by free choice, 
performed for their own sake, and proceeding from internal dispositions. 
For Aristotle these are fixed habits, but for Eckhart they “are something 
more like gradually proceeding conformations” of the individual to the 
divine source. This line of thought is powerfully developed in a lengthy 
passage in the liber ‘Benedictus,’ where Eckhart says in part, “We have a 
clear illustration of this teaching [on inner and outer work] in a stone. . . . 
In the same way I say that virtue has an inner work: a will and tendency 
toward all good and a flight from and repugnance to all that is bad, evil 
and incompatible with God and goodness.”41
In the (quasi-)Aristotelian framework of thought common to both 
Thomas Aquinas and Eckhart, the virtues and the virtuous actions to 
which they give rise play a central role. Indeed, for Aristotle they are the 
very essence of happiness, and it is fundamental to his conception of vir-
tuous action qua virtuous that it is performed for its own sake. Aquinas, 
as we saw, argues that a life of virtuous behavior for its own sake is not 
our true happiness; virtuous behavior remains central, but now is largely 
a means to the end, the Beatific Vision.
40Kobusch, mystik, p. 58.
41dW 5, p. 39. The entire long passage runs from page 38, line 3 to page 42, line 
20.
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Eckhart, for all his distance from Aristotle on the question of the nature 
of our blessedness, avoids Aquinas’s uncoupling of virtuous action from 
our goal. Indeed, his idea that the just person qua just acts justly for its 
own sake, and not for some goal distinct from it, is Aristotelian through 
and through. So another way to express the idea of “living without why” 
would be to say: “live virtuously.” That is, be just, good, wise, temperate, 
courageous, etc., without thought of reward: do not be a merchant. A third 
way to put Eckhart’s point might be this: since on his view of analogy our 
very being is adopted from the divine being, and since the human mode of 
being is to live and live rationally, it follows that for us to “live genuinely” 
is to live a life of the virtues, that is, to live without why.
What then could the “genuine man” mean when he says “I act because 
I act”? Note, first, that this curt answer is somewhat misleading. Recall 
what Eckhart says of the just person in Sermon 6: “The just are so set on 
justice that if God were not just, they would not care a bean for God.” 
The motivation of the “genuine man” does have content, but it comes 
from the “inner act,” and not from anything whatsoever considered to be 
outside him:
one should not work for any ‘why,’ neither for God nor one’s honor 
nor for anything at all that is outside of oneself, but only for that which 
is one’s own being and one’s own life within oneself. (Ibid., p. 113)
Kurt Flasch puts it this way: “The just person, insofar as he is just, is jus-
tice; next to that, heaven and earth, purgatory and hell count for nothing. 
This leads to the elimination of the reward-motive and every means-end con-
struction of life. Life is its own goal. The just person lives in justice; he lives 
not to do the will of God and thereby attain heaven. God only interests 
him insofar as God is justice itself.”42 Thus, in saying “I act because I act,” 
the “genuine man” means “I, the just person, act thus because justice, with 
which I am one, acts through me; and justice—which is my motive—has 
no goal outside itself.”
Hence what Eckhart calls the “inner act,” this “conformation” of the 
human being to the divine virtues, is not itself an intention. Indeed, I 
think it is best identified, as we just saw Flasch do, with a motive (or 
set of motives). As Michael Stocker and others have argued, motives—at 
least in one important sense of the term—are the ground-from-which we 
act, the “out of,” rather than the goal or purpose, the “for the sake of.”43 
While only implicit in Eckhart’s texts, this distinction between motive 
and intention is the only way I can see to make sense of what Eckhart 
says, though it is not discussed by his modern interpreters. Beccarisi, for 
instance, writes that “God, in whom the general perfections are united, 
42Kurt Flasch, “zu Predigt 6: Justi vivent in aeternum,” in lectura ii, p. 50, empha-
sis added. Compare Bruce Milem, The unspoken Word (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2002), p. 125.
43In Stocker’s turn of phrase these two orientations are ‘teleology’ (forward-
looking) and ‘archeology’ (backward-looking). See his “Values and Purposes: the 
Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,” The Journal of philosophy 78:12 
(1981).
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is at work in man to the extent he is good or just, that is, in man in a 
non-creaturely sense, who is not guided by external principles, but rather 
. . . ‘attends to no why outside himself,’ but acts only through himself.”44 
She is right about Eckhart, but what precisely is meant by the phrase she 
quotes from Eckhart, to wit, “acts only through himself”? So too with 
Kobusch: “This [ground-act of] self-negation, detaching from oneself 
and surrendering, is to be thought of as a movement of the will. For this 
reason, Eckhart can speak in the same sense of ‘giving up the will.’ It is 
not at all that giving up the will makes a person will-less, rather it annihi-
lates only the ‘natural will,’ to use the terminology of Eckhart and Hegel, 
that is, the particular will with its drives, desires and inclinations.”45 True 
enough, but Kobusch does not specify what “giving up” this “natural 
will” which “does not make one will-less” might mean. In medieval 
thought, acts (or actualizations) of will can include inclinations, desires, 
choices, intentions, enjoyment, etc., to which one can appropriately add 
motives (as distinct from intentions). Which is it that Eckhart’s “genuine 
man” gives up?
In an important passage for this theme, Kobusch writes: “The object of 
every act of will is the good. However, while the creaturely will always 
wants only ‘this’ or ‘that,’ that is, wants ‘to have,’ the moral person places 
his will in the Good that lies beyond all ways, in the simply and uncon-
ditionally Good, or as Eckhart says the ‘Absolute Good,’ the Good in its 
truth. This moral good in the sense of general justice cannot be an object of 
the will like the many external goods. Rather, as the actually and finally willed, 
it determines the essence of the human being. Hence everything that one 
does out of willing this absolute good bears the character of the moral.”46 
I agree with the first italicized phrase, but not with the suggestion in the 
next two sentences, where the terms “willed” and “willing” suggest a fi-
nal goal or intention, and thus, since every intention supplies a “why,” 
would trap Eckhart in a contradiction. Instead, I suggest we see Eckhart 
as drawing tacitly on the distinction between motive and intention. His 
“general justice” is the new motive, replacing the merchant’s “reward-
motive.” Acting out of it, the new person does all that she does. The Eck-
hartian agent becomes new in that she now has a different motivation for 
everything she does, including those same deeds, e.g., attending to the 
needs of her guests or of the poor and sick, which she might formerly have 
performed out of a different, and radically inferior, motivation.
If one’s actions (e.g., tending the sick) were not intentional, they could 
not express any motive at all. An external goal or intention only makes 
one’s action unworthy, according to Eckhart, when it is inconsistent with 
the motive of general justice. A spiritual merchant’s failing is not that she 
has goals or intentions in her actions: these are unavoidable. Her error is 
to perform her good deeds out of an instrumental conception of virtue. 
She misunderstands herself and her relationship to God, and hence her 
motive is defective. Her will is oriented to a future or further end, based 
on the misconception that her eudaimonia lies either in a state outside 
44A. Beccarisi, in lectura ii, p. 16.
45Kobusch, mystik, p. 54. The Eckhart text referred to is in dW V, pp. 45, l. 12.
46Kobusch, mystik, pp. 56–57, emphases added.
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herself (Thomas), or in one always still to be achieved through her own 
efforts (Aristotle). Such a will we do not need; indeed, Eckhart’s injunction 
to live without why means precisely to live without this kind of reward-
motive. For through God’s grace our eudaimonia already lies within us, in 
the ground of the soul. What we need is to accept it, through detachment, 
an acceptance that is then manifested in virtuous actions.
To the extent the moral virtues are character-traits, they represent a 
kind of standing motive: a courageous person is inclined toward certain 
sorts of acts, and not others, out of her courage. Motivations are embodied 
in intentional actions (as well as in attitudes, emotional responses, et al.), 
and the intentions that embody a motive depend on particular circum-
stances. As Mieth says, “Elisabeth lives from the infused theological vir-
tues of faith, hope, and love. . . . The outcome of these virtues is true inner 
poverty, which can coexist with external wealth. But the completion of the 
virtues infused into the powers of the soul lies clearly in active love: ‘she 
strives to be able, with a pure heart, to wash and care for sick and filthy 
human beings.’”47 This “completion” is in concrete action, which of course 
embodies the ‘why’ of intentions, though without making the virtuous 
action itself a means to some external goal, such as salvation.48
Like Eckhart, Aristotle too thought that virtuous action is, in the sense 
explained here, “without a why,” that is, performed for its own sake. In 
this respect Eckhart is closer to him than Aquinas is, though Eckhart dif-
fers from both in seeing a life of virtue as the expression of our perfection, 
and not as either a means to it or the mode of life which constitutes it. 
While Eckhart’s ethic is what I call broadly teleological, that is, it aims to 
discover, describe, and advocate a process of human development toward 
beatitude or happiness, it diverges from Aquinas on the nature and role of 
the virtues, and from both Aquinas and Aristotle on the nature and role of 
moral action and of life’s goal.
Such a striking break in ethics with teleological conceptions of action 
and virtue may be unique in university circles in the middle ages,49 and it 
would seem to be deserving of closer attention from contemporary moral 
philosophers and theologians. An ethic that puts detachment at its center 
should have a serious claim on our interest in this day and age. Why then 
has Eckhart’s approach been relatively ignored outside of Germany for so 
long? This is likely a long-term effect of the papal condemnation, which 
for centuries denied to Eckhart’s works the careful collecting and editing 
given to the writings of many of his medieval colleagues. Even Nicho-
las Cusanus (d. 1464), himself inspired by Eckhart, wrote that “his books 
should be removed from public places, for the people are not ready for 
what he often intersperses,” even though (Cusanus adds) “the intelligent 
47Mieth, lectura ii, p. 172, emphasis added. The Eckhart citation is from dW 2, 
p. 147.
48The topic of intentions and motives in Eckhart is admittedly complex; I plan 
to treat it more fully in a future paper.
49But something very like it is to be found in the work of Eckhart’s contempo-
rary, the Beguine Marguerite Porète’s mirror of simple souls. Eckhart’s relationship 
to that work is explored in meister Eckhart and the Beguine mystics, ed. Bernard 
McGinn (New York: Continuum, 1997).
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find in [these works] many astute and useful things.”50 The ripple effects 
of this suppression have, for example, made his works largely unavailable 
to English-language scholars until quite recently. Perhaps Eckhart, now 
restored to “public places” by the sometimes heroic labors of recent gen-
erations of scholars, will again take his rightful place in the philosophical 
conversation.51 If so, the debates over virtue-ethics can only benefit.
smith College
50Nicholas of Cusa, apologia doctae ignorantiae, vol. 2, ed. Raymond Klibansky, 
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1932f), pp. 25, lines 7–12. I owe this reference to 
Burkhard Mojsisch, “Meister Eckhart,” in the stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, 
2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meister-eckhart/ .
51The books and other efforts of Bernard McGinn have been especially notewor-
thy on the American scene. Cf. also footnotes 17, 18, and 50, above.
